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Abstract
Using data from the last 150 years in a small set of countries, and
from the postwar period in a large set of countries, we show that large
investments in state primary education systems tend to occur when
countries face military rivals or threats from their neighbors. By con-
trast, we find that democratic transitions are negatively associated
with education investments, while the presence of democratic politi-
cal institutions magnifies the positive eﬀect of military rivalries. These
empirical results are robust to a number of statistical concerns and
continue to hold when we instrument military rivalries with commod-
ity prices or rivalries in a certain country’s immediate neighborhood.
We also present historical case studies, as well as a simple model, that
are consistent with the econometric evidence.
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What makes countries engage in mass education investments? A common
view is that such investments are the flipside of democratic transitions (see
e.g., Bourguignon and Verdier, 2000). Absent democracy, the elite chooses
to deny mass access to education in order to secure its power, while the in-
troduction of democracy — extending the franchise, increasing electoral com-
petition, or putting tighter constraints on the executive — promotes decisions
that favor mass education. This explanation might look quite convincing,
and seemingly accounts for the history of education enrollment in Europe
starting with France. Indeed, Figure 1 (drawn from Lindert, 2004), suggests
that public contributions to primary-school education went up sharply in
1880, once France had completed its transition from the Second Empire to
the Third Republic, which clearly reflected a move towards greater democ-
racy.1
Figure 1 about here
However, another event that precipitated the fall of the Second Empire is
France’s defeat against Germany in the 1870 Battle of Sedan. In the words
of Lindert
“The resounding defeat by Prussia tipped the scales in favor of the
education reformers. Enrollments and expenditures accelerated
across the 1870s, with local taxation leading the way. The real
victory of universal tax-based education came with Jules Ferry’s
Laic Laws of the 1880s, especially the 1881 law abolishing all
fees and tuitions charges in public elementary schools....While
national politics could not deliver a centralized victory for uni-
versal schooling before the military defeat of 1870....after 1881
centralization performed the mopping up role...” (Lindert, 2004a,
p. 112)
One reason why a military defeat may spur centralized investment in mass
education is suggested in the work of Eugene Weber on the modernization of
rural France between 1870 and 1914 (Weber, 1979). A highly disintegrated
1The complementary view that education favors democracy is analyzed, in particular,
by Glaeser et al. (2007).
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population, largely illiterate, speaking a multiplicity of dialects, and with no
sense of nationhood2, was to be transformed into a unified people sharing
the same patriotic values, a spoken and written language, a set of moral
principles, and a motivation and ability to defend France in future conflicts3.
In this paper, we study historical panel data on education spending and
enrollment — for Europe since the 19th century and a larger set of countries
in the postwar period — to assess the correlation between military rivalry (or
war risk) and primary education enrollment (or the occurrence of educational
reforms). First, we perform standard OLS regressions and find that, condi-
tional on country and year fixed eﬀects, mass education is positively and
significantly associated with military rivalry, or involvement in an external
war in the previous 10 years. Moreover, while the coeﬃcient on democracy
(gauged by the Polity IV index) comes out negative when we control for mil-
itary rivalry, the interaction between the two variables is often positively and
significantly associated with mass education. The coeﬃcient on military ri-
valry remains stable when we control for the political regime, suggesting that
military threats have a stable and independent influence on mass education.
To deal with appropriate concerns about endogeneity, we then instru-
ment military rivalry in two diﬀerent ways. Our first instrument uses data
on commodity prices. The idea is that high prices of natural resources or agri-
cultural commodities likely foster rivalries, as states are tempted to compete
for control of more valuable resources. Our second instrument uses rivalries
with third countries of those countries with which a certain country shares
a border. The idea here is to captures when military rivalries are rife in a
country’s neighborhood. The corresponding IV specifications show a positive
and significant eﬀect of rivalry on primary enrollment, a negative direct ef-
fect of democracy, and (for the second instrument) a positive and significant
interaction term between the two. Overall, our empirical results indicate a
causal relationship from rivalry to primary educational enrollment.
Our paper relates to, at least, three literatures. As for the relationship
between public education investment and democracy, Lott (1999) suggests
that non-democracies could invest more than democracies in public educa-
tion as a means of indoctrination. On the other hand, Glaeser et al. (2007)
argue that education and democracy should be positively correlated, due to
2As a French novelist of that time would put it “In Velay, the word "patrie" signifies
nothing and stirs nothing. It exists no more in local speech than in local hearts”.
3As Leon Gambetta would say to the leader of the Breton forces: “I beg you to forget
that you are Bretons, and to remember only that you are French”.
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the need for civic participation to raise support for transitions from dicta-
torship into democracy. But the evidence for a positive relationship between
education spending or enrollment and democracy is mixed, at best. In partic-
ular, Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin (2004) present cross-country evidence
indicating that more democratic political institutions do not seem to corre-
late with higher levels of social expenditures and, in particular, higher public
education spending. More recently, Bursztyn (2011) shows that poor voters
in Brazil might prefer the government to allocate resources to redistributive
policies, yielding immediate income increases (such as cash transfers), in-
stead of allocating resources to public primary education. Also related to
our analysis is the work by Bourguignon and Verdier (2000), who develop
a model to explain why the ruling class may sometimes decide to invest
in education even though schooling enhances political participation. Along
similar lines, Galor et al (2006) argue that capital accumulation gradually
intensifies the importance of skilled labor in production and therefore gen-
erates support among the ruling class for investing more in human capital.
Galor et al. (2008) argue that a higher concentration of land ownership typ-
ically discourages the development of human capital enhancing institutions,
in particular schooling. However, none of these papers looks at the eﬀect of
military threats in democracies and autocracies.
A second related literature deals with the economic and political impact
of wars. On the latter, Ticchi and Vindigni (2009) analyze theoretically
a mechanism whereby international conflict may trigger democratic transi-
tions, motivated by a large amount of earlier research in political science and
political sociology, such as Giddens (1985), and empirical facts presented by
Dolman (2004). Another literature on the economic impact of wars starts
with Anderton and Carter (2001), Blomberg and Hess (2006), and Glick and
Taylor (2005). More recent work by Martin, Mayer and Thoenig (2008a, b)
and by Acemoglu and Yared (2009) evaluates the extent to which wars reduce
trade flows. This research does not generally investigate the links between
wars and investment in education, though.
A third related literature deals with fiscal capacity and state capacity
more generally. Hintze (1975) and Tilly (1975), preceding many others, pro-
vide historical accounts on the importance of wars for state building. More
recently, an economic literature summarized in Besley and Persson (2011)
considers theoretically investments in fiscal and legal capacity, and finds ro-
bust correlations between past wars and current state capacity in interna-
tional panel data. Thies (2004), using the same measure of strategic rivalry
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as we do, shows that military rivalry raises fiscal capacity in postcolonial
developing states. Scheve and Stasavage (2011) investigate the links between
wars, democracy, and estate taxation in about 20 countries since 1816 and
find that democracy does not have a systematic influence on top rates of
estate taxation, whereas wars with mass mobilizations do significantly raise
these rates. Analogously, we find support for a correlation between past wars
(and military rivalry more generally) and current educational investments,
while (in parallel to Scheve and Stasavage), the correlation between wars and
democracy is more tenuous. In addition, we find that the eﬀect of military
rivalry on educational investment is larger in democracies, something possi-
bly quite specific to education. Also, in contrast to this literature, we treat
state capacity as exogenous, both in the theory part and in our empirical
analysis.
We have organized the paper as follows. In Section 2, we describe three
historical examples that speak to the relationship between military rivalry
and education reforms. We also show that in nearly all countries, for which
we have long enough time series, periods with large hikes in primary enroll-
ment are preceded by wars rather than by transitions to democracy. Section
3 presents our data, descriptive statistics, and empirical specification. In Sec-
tion 4, we describe the econometric results and discuss their robustness to a
variety of factual and statistical concerns. In Section 5, we lay out a simple
model that rationalizes our main empirical findings. Section 6 concludes.
2 Lessons From History
While each national history has unique elements that cannot be forced into
a unified framework, the examples of France, Japan, and Prussia over the
19th century all suggest a relationship between military defeats or rivalry
and educational reforms. Prussia led the way in terms of primary enrollment
rates in Europe from 1815 until about 1860. In the 1880s, France overtook
Prussia as the European enrollment leader. In addition we look at Japan,
a leading Asian country at the end of the 19th century, which ended up
emulating the Prussian and French models in its own transition to mass
education. For each of these examples, we describe the historical context,
the debate that emerged due to a volatile international environment, and the
subsequent education reforms with a particular focus on primary enrollment.
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2.1 Prussia under Stein and Humboldt
Background As late as 1803, Prussian King Frederick William III would
declare:
“the children of this hardworking Volksklasse should not become
lecturers, not chancellery oﬃcials, not mathematicians, not reli-
gion professors. They should learn to read their catechism, Bible,
and hymnal, to write and calculate in accordance to their lim-
ited circumstances, to love and fear God and behave accordingly”
(Lindert, 2004, p. ).
However, after the humiliating defeat to Napoleon I in Jena in 1806, which
took the Hohenzollern Monarchy by surprise, the King asked Baron Karl
von Stein to head a new ministry devoted to the improvement of Prussian
institutions and infrastructures “to make Prussia as vital and as strong as
France”.
The Reform Process Stein did not originally pay much attention to edu-
cation. His primary focus was on the organization and administration of the
Prussian state. But he understood the importance of promoting patriotism
among the population — he first tried to do so through a city governance re-
form, in the hope that the participation of the community in its own aﬀairs
would create a civic sense. Stein realized that his major reforms, namely the
end of villeinage, the reform of the army, and the self-administration of the
towns, could be unsuccessful due to the insuﬃcient level of education. He
thought that Wilhelm von Humboldt would be capable of bringing about a
complete reform of the Prussian education system and called him to Berlin.
Thus, on February 28, 1809, von Humboldt became head of the culture and
education section at the Ministry of the Interior, although Stein had left of-
fice by then. Napoleon had called for his dismissal and the King of Prussia
had agreed to that request.
“From the beginning of the crisis, even prior to the startling de-
feats of Jena and Auerstadt, two views were competing in govern-
ment circles about the future direction of Prussia” (Gray, 1986,
p. 47)
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A “peace party” was organized around von Haugwitz and Lombard, while
the “patriots” followed Stein and von Hardenberg. Von Humboldt endorsed
the ideals defended by Stein, who had said that
“the chief idea was to arouse a moral, religious and patriotic spirit
in the nation, to instill into it again courage, confidence, readiness
for every sacrifice in behalf of independence from foreigners and
for the national honor, and to seize the first favorable opportunity
to begin the bloody and hazardous struggle” (Ford, 1965, p. 122).
Humboldt sensed that his reforms could play a key role in the survival of
Prussia. He had developed his ideas in the July 1809 treatise Über Die Mit
Dem Königsberger Schulwesen Vorzunehmende Reformen (On reforms to ex-
ecute with the teaching in Königsberg) and was able to initiate fundamental
reforms of curricula, teaching methods, teacher education, and auditing in
the school system. His reforms delegated the powers to administer and fund
schools to local communities in order to circumvent the surveillance of the
French. (They also helped found Berlin University.) However, his perception
of insuﬃcient support for his plan to reform educational administration un-
der the current government led Humboldt to present his resignation to the
King in the spring of 1810.
After the defeat of Napoleon in 1815 to a coalition of European pow-
ers, the immediate external threat to Prussia was removed and the Prussian
government stopped endorsing the ideal of reform. Yet, “once the reformed
Prussian educational framework was in place, it could not be dislodged by
the subsequent waves of conservatism” (Lindert, 2004), because von Hum-
boldt had set up a decentralized education system. In 1876, funds from the
Prussian state accounted for only 9% of the budgets of public primary schools,
endowments for 3%, fees for 15%, and the remaining 73% came from local
taxes. Throughout the 19th century, the provision of local education in Ger-
man communities kept increasing, and Prussia eventually became the leader
in primary enrollment. In this respect, von Humboldt’s reforms had lasting
consequences. It is also interesting to note that Stein encouraged democrati-
zation of towns to gain the support of the population. This may suggest that
the probability of successful educational reform is higher in democracies.
The Outcomes The educational reforms in Prussia had a substantial long-
run impact. Of the cohorts born in Prussia before 1801, 16.8% of males were
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completely illiterate, as against 2.9% for males born between 1837 and 1841.
4The literacy rate inched up towards 85% in 1850 and Prussia became the
European leader with regard to primary enrollment until the 1880s. The
primary school enrollment per 10,000 inhabitants 5 rose from 1,131 in 1815
to 1,592 in 1850.
2.2 Jules Ferry’s France
Background In 1870, French public expenditure on education were lag-
ging behind that of Prussia and other European countries. The French educa-
tion system was mainly private, largely revolving around churches. Teaching
was done by priests or more casually by anyone around (be it the baker,
the butcher,..), who knew how to read. Classrooms were often improvised
in the backyard of a farm, with poor equipment and amenities. And a large
fraction of registered children never attended school. The result was that a
large fraction of the population was either illiterate or unable to understand
the content of a text. In 1863, 7.5 million citizens (about a fifth of the French
population) could not even speak French properly but only local dialects.
Even prior to the war with Prussia in 1870, French elites were aware of
the fact that the French education system had failed to promote national
unity. Victor Duruy, appointed Minister of Education in 1863 by Napoleon
III, was already advocating sweeping educational reforms, the improvement
of educational facilities, and the development of technical education. His
plans were in many ways similar to those that Jules Ferry would pursue
some 20 years later6. Duruy tried to gather political support and convince
the Emperor that it was in his own interest to implement such a reform. But
he did not succeed, partly due to a lack of support from a rural population
influenced by the Church.7
4Source: Block, Rainer (1995), Der Alphabetisierungsverlauf im Preussen des 19.
Jahrhunderts: Quantitative Explorationen aus bildungshistorischer Perspektive , Euro-
pean University Studies (Series XI, Education).
5School02 variable from the CNTS data archive (Banks, 2011).
6“Duruy’s major objective was to make primary education compulsory and tuition free
so that each citizen could fulfill his duties under universal suﬀrage and contribute to the
burgeoning economy” (Moody, 1978, p. 72).
7“In a letter to the Emperor on 6 February 1866, [Duruy] maintained that his plan
would embarrass the Orleanists, the clericals and the republicans, and win millions of
families to the Empire, particularly the parents of the million and a half pupils who were
now accepted free, but under the stigma of charity” (Moody, p. 72). In fact, Duruy never
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The turning point was the French defeat against Prussia in 1870. On
September 2, 1870, Napoleon III was made prisoner at Sedan, and on Feb-
ruary 26, 1871, Germany took control of the French regions of Alsace and
Lorraine. This resounding defeat prompted the fall of the Second Empire
and helped trigger the subsequent educational reforms by the leaders of the
Third Republic.
The Reform Process After the Sedan defeat, the debate would continue
between conservatives forces opposing and progressive forces supporting ed-
ucational reforms, even though the balance of power had shifted towards
the latter. While the conservatives led by the Church would see Sedan as a
punishment for France’s infidelity to its old (monarchical) traditions, the pro-
gressives saw Sedan as a reflection of the superiority of Prussian schools and
university system.8 Overall, even though groups and political parties would
still disagree on the causes of military defeat, a majority of them agreed that
education in Prussia had played a key role in the rise of this new power, and
that education in France had to be reformed, not only to increase literacy,
but also to acquaint new generations with basic knowledge in arithmetics,
history and geography, and to
“teach Frenchmen to be confident of their nation’s superiority in
managed to reduce the hostility of the rural masses, who looked on farm labor as a natural
apprenticeship, and consequently Napoleon decided to let the project of his minister be
defeated by the legislature.
8“Unexpected defeat, occupation, and sanguinary civil war fixed 1870-71 in the French
consciousness as ‘the terrible year.’ Several national myths were deposed, end of the vision
of national glory built during the Second Empire. [. . . ] Frenchmen who had lived through
the experience were aware that defeat had exacerbated the social and political divisions
of the nation — the Commune provided brutal evidence. But intellectual disagreements
were also sharpened as Frenchmen sought for a cause of the disasters that had befallen
them. [. . . ] There was a debate about the source of the defeat: the prime culprit was the
Empire and all its works. The right viewed Sedan as deserved punishment for infidelity
to the traditions of France. Toward the Church there was an initial ambivalence. Most
people thought that ‘France had neglected intellectual formation, particularly in the sci-
ences [. . . ].’ There was nearly universal belief among the French elite that Prussia had
triumphed because of the superiority of its celebrated universities: a popular aphorism
was that the University of Berlin was the revenge for the defeat at Iena. French praise
for German education extended to all levels of the system. Journalists repeated the dicta
that the Prussian elementary school teacher was the architect of Sedan and that the mod-
ern secondary education of the Realschulen had provided the scientific base for Prussian
military eﬃciency.” (Moody, p. 87).
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law, civilization and republican institutions. It should be consis-
tent with reigning social values, and thereby eliminate disruptive
conflicts and promote the unity of the classes. Since France no
longer enjoyed religious unity, it must forge a new moral unity
from a unified education that would teach civic morality based
on the principles of natural reason” (Moody, 1978, p. 88).
Jules Ferry was appointed the new Minister of Education in February
1879. In 1881, he abolished all tuitions fees in public elementary schools;
in 1882, he made school enrollment compulsory from age six to thirteen; in
1883, it became compulsory for every village with more than twenty children
at school age to host a public elementary school; in 1885, subsidies were
devoted to the building and maintenance of schools and to paying teachers;
and in 1886, an elementary teaching program was established, together with
monitoring provisions. These are the so-called “Laic Laws”, which still char-
acterize the French educational system today. At the same time, a whole
infrastructure program — the Freycinet plan — was initiated to facilitate chil-
dren’s access to schools. Millions of francs were spent on building roads to
match the large amounts spent on schools: 17,320 new schools had to be
built, 5,428 schools were enlarged, 8,381 schools were repaired.9As a result,
enrollment as well as attendance in primary education steadily increased.
The reforms not only generalized the access to schooling, but also trans-
formed the content of elementary education: new programs emphasized ge-
ography, history, and dictation. The new teaching programs in history and
geography aimed at conveying patriotic values to new generations. As for
dictations, they were useful to teach people the French language but, beyond
that
“the exercise was a sort of catechism designed to teach the child
that it was his duty to defend the fatherland, to shed his blood or
die for the commonwealth, to obey the government, to perform
military service, to work, learn, pay taxes and so on” (Lindert,
2004, p. 333).
From their very first day at school, children were taught that their first
duty was to defend the fatherland. Even gymnastics were meant “to develop
9Source: Weber, E (1979), Peasants into Frenchmen : The Modernization of Rural
France, 1870-1914 , Chatto & Windus.
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in the child the idea of discipline, and prepare him [. . . ] to be a good soldier
and a good Frenchman.”
The Outcomes Oﬃcial statistics attest that school attendance rose ap-
preciably in the decade after 1882. Primary enrollment rates went up from
1,176 per 10,000 inhabitants in 1870 to 1,430 in 1912. Literacy rates rose
from 80% in 1870 to 96% in 1912 (and the initial 80% figure is partly mis-
leading, as most supposedly literate children did not understand the content
of what they read prior to the reforms). Finally, the reforms appear to have
increased the sense of patriotism and national unity. Thanks to the Ferry
laws, “in Ain, Ardennes, Vendee, all children became familiar with references
or identities that could thereafter be used by the authorities, the press, and
the politicians to appeal to them as a single body” (Lindert, 2004, p. 337),
and in that respect Ferry’s eﬀorts paid oﬀ during the subsequent mobilization
in 1914.
2.3 Japan in the Meiji Era
Background From the 17th century, Japan was ruled bymilitary lords (the
so-called shoguns) of the Tokugawa dynasty. Under the Tokugawa, education
was a privilege of the Samurais and centered on tradition and the study of
Confucian classics. However, starting in the mid 1850s, Japan came under
threats by Western powers. In 1853, Commodore Matthew Perry from the
US arrived in Japan with an ultimatum to the authorities: agree to trade or
suﬀer the consequences of war. To add credibility to this threat, American
warships were sent to Japan in 1854. Subsequently, the Trade Convention
of Kanagawa was signed on 31 March, 1854. The threats posed to Japan by
Western powers in the second half of the 19th century acted as a catalyst for
educational reforms. As put by Duke:
“In 1872, government leaders were haunted by a crisis of inter-
national proportions. Powerful western nations were expanding
trading posts throughout the world. European colonial empires
had spread into the Far East, threatening the very existence of
Japan as a sovereign state. During the years of self-imposed iso-
lation by the Tokugawa regime from the early 1600s, the country
had fallen dangerously behind the West as the industrial revolu-
tion got under way. The rise of western capitalism and interna-
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tional colonialism posed a pervasive threat to Japan, as perceived
by the new leaders. They were determined to use any means nec-
essary to transform their country into a modern state in order to
preserve the political order and the national sovereignty. Educa-
tion on the Western model was envisioned as an instrument to
achieve that goal.” (Duke, 2009, p. 1).
The Tokugawa implemented various reforms at the beginning of the 1860s,
but did not go far enough to satisfy the Samurais. As a result, Japan fell
into civil war. In early January 1868, the insurgents prompted the Emperor
Meiji, who had just taken the throne, to announce an “imperial restoration,”
which in fact was nothing less than a coup d’Etat.
The Reform Process The education debate featured the opposition be-
tween those who wanted to preserve the focus on Confucian classics and
maintain interpersonal hierarchical relationships, and those who wanted to
introduce secular Western science with more mathematical thinking to catch
up with Western technology. This debate fed a broader political crisis, cul-
minating with the civil war. Following the imperial restoration”, Western-
oriented progressives eventually prevailed over Eastern-oriented traditional-
ists. The newly founded Ministry of Education sent delegates to the West to
learn about their education system, for instance with the Iwakura mission of
1872-1873.
To rise up to the challenges posed by the West, in 1872, a new education
system was instituted which declared four years of compulsory elementary
education for all children. As explained by Burnett and Wada (2007),
“in just a one-year period following the Gakusei of 1872, 12,500
primary schools were established. Within the next five years the
number of schools doubled to a figure not surpassed until the
1960s.”
The move to mass education was completed by a national training system
for teachers. The first teacher’s college was created in Tokyo in July 1872,
based on American principles of elementary-school instruction.
The Outcomes Initially, reactions to the educational reform were mixed.
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“Not everyone was so happy at the obligation to attend school
and the opportunity to graduate. The elementary schools were to
be financed by a 10 percent local surcharge to the national prop-
erty tax. In the 1870s, angry taxpayers reacted to compulsory
schooling as they had to the draft: they rioted. Crowds of people
destroyed at least two thousand schools, usually be setting them
afire. This represented close to one-tenth of the total number of
schools. The passive resistance of simply not going to school was
even more widespread. Rates of attendance for school-age boys
and girls stood at 25 to 50 percent of the eligible population for
the first decade of the new system” (Gordon, 2000, p. 68).
One might argue that popular resistance to the educational reforms reflected
a lack of democracy in the Japanese system — the peasants did not identify
with the emperor, nor with the new ruling class, and therefore disapproved
of the nationalistic education that was now compulsory. Similarly, people at
first tried to resist the military reform.
Yet, over time, the Japanese educational reforms appeared more and more
a resounding success. Japan overtook most European powers with regard to
primary enrollment per school-age child, which rose from 28.1% in 1873 to
98.1% in 1910. From 1865 to 1910, the literacy rate increased from 35% to
75% for men and from 8% to 68% for women. The primary-school enrollment
per 10,000 inhabitants rose with blistering speed, from 65 in 1876 to 1,122
in 1905.
The success of education reforms certainly played a role in the unexpected
military victories by Japan in the 1895 war against China and the 1905 war
against Russia. Overall, Japan’s educational reforms during the Meiji era
further illustrate the idea that education reform occur as a result of strategic
military concerns. The Japanese example is probably even clearer than the
French one, in that the military considerations clearly took precedence over
humanist ones. The popular resistance to the reforms may reflect the fact
that a lack of democracy reduces the eﬀectiveness of the educational reform.
2.4 Taking Stock
Figure 2 summarizes our historical overview of educational reforms in Prus-
sia, France and Japan. In all three cases, military defeats and/or perceived
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military threats appear to have prompted an otherwise reluctant ruling class
to invest in mass primary education.
Figure 2 about here
Let us also take a less detailed bird’s-eye view on historical evidence from
the large sample (of 137 countries) that we use for econometric estimation in
the next section. We restrict attention to 53 countries within that sample for
which more than forty years of primary enrollment data are available. For
each of these countries, we first identify the twenty-year period, during which
primary enrollment rose the most sharply — we call this the “educational
reform period”10). We then look at the preceding twenty years to see whether
a war or a democratic transition took place during that period. We use
the polity2 index from the Polity IV database11 and define a democratic
transition as occurring when the polity2 variable moves from the “anocracy”
to the “democracy” range, i.e., when crossing the score of 6 (at a scale from
-10 to 10) from below. We identify external wars from the Correlates of War
dataset12 and military rivalry data are drawn from Thompson (2001). These
two datasets are described in more details in the next section.
Table 1 summarizes our findings. The first column indicates the educational-
reform period, the second whether or not a war occurred during the preceding
twenty years, while the third indicates whether a democratic transition oc-
curred in the preceding twenty years.
Table 1 about here
The table shows clearly that in most countries of the sample a war precedes
the educational reform, while a democratic transition rarely occurs in the pre-
reform period. Among the 53 countries in this table, it is only in two countries
where a democratic transition occurs before the rise in education. Most often,
the democratic transition instead takes place after the educational reform
period13
10The educational reform period in Table 1 is defined as the period during which the
change in primary enrollment rate was the greatest in percentage terms, not in absolute
value.
11See the dataset http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
12http://www.correlatesofwar.org/
13See Appendix B for details about the dates of wars and democratization, as well as
the availability of data on primary enrollment per country.
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However, in several countries in this sample the sharpest increase in pri-
mary enrollment took place after the first or the second World War, and
the degree of involvement in either of those wars varied a great deal across
countries. More generally, the table by no means shows any causal evidence.
Also, our identification of the “educational reform” is very crude and may
miss important changes in the education system. For example, in the case of
France as well as Germany, the greatest increase in primary enrollment does
not coincide with the reform periods pinpointed in the historical case studies
above14. Yet, this crude measure of educational reform hints at the possibil-
ity that wars, and more generally military threats, play a more important a
role than democratic transitions in promoting broad access to education.
Subsections 2.1-2.3 presented case-study evidence about wars or military
threats leading to educational reforms for Prussia, France and Japan. Sub-
section 2.4 presented cruder but broader historical evidence suggesting that
wars or military rivalry are likely drivers of educational reform, while democ-
racy may not be. In the next section, we turn to a more systematic empirical
analysis of the relationship between primary enrollment, military wars or
rivalry, and democracy.
3 Data and Specifications
3.1 Sources and Variable Definitions
Education To investigate the determinants of mass education reforms em-
pirically, we use an unbalanced panel with annual data for 137 countries
between 1830 and 2001. Our main dependent variable, , mea-
sures primary enrollment per capita. It is defined according to the UNESCO
criteria and expressed per 10,000 inhabitants. The underlying data are drawn
from the CNTS Data Archive of Banks (2011). In a first set of regressions,
we use primary enrollment as a continuous dependent variable. Since it is
constructed as enrollment per capita, rather than enrollment per school-age
child, this measure is aﬀected by shifts in the demographic structure of the
population. We therefore control for population growth in the previous 10
years to mitigate this concern.
14In France, measured literacy rates were already high prior by 1870. Yet the Jules
Ferry reforms of the 1880s raised the average educational level of the French population
to a considerable extent compared to what it was before 1880.
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We also analyze the probability of education reforms, where reform is
defined in two alternative ways. For the complete sample of countries, a
binary imputed reform variable is set equal to one in a given year if primary
enrollment grew by more than 10% over the previous 5-year period. When
we perform the analysis of imputed reforms, we collapse the data into five-
year averages so as to minimize measurement error. For a reduced sample
of 14 European countries (over the period 1830 to 1975), a binary known
reform variable is set equal to one in years when new education reforms were
adopted. The latter entail any new law which extends compulsory education,
lowers the cost of education (e.g., abolish school fees, provide for free primary
education), or increases the number of schools (e.g., by making it compulsory
for each municipality to set up at least one primary school). The source for
this variable is Flora (1983).
War Threats We measure war risk and vulnerability to military threats in
two alternative ways. Recent experience of external war is likely to raise the
perceived likelihood of a new conflict and the salience of military concerns in
policy decisions. Hence, our first variable war risk is a binary indicator set
equal to one if the country was engaged in an interstate war in the previous
10 years, according to the variable "inter-state war" in the Correlates of War
(COW) database. This database also provides information on the outcome
(victory or defeat) of past wars and a (crude) measure of the number of
casualties as a percentage of the pre-war population.
This measure of war risk is, of course, completely backward-looking and
may therefore miss emerging threats without a history of war. Our sec-
ond measure, military rivalry, is less subject to this concern. Here, we
define a dummy variable for whether a country has a strategic rival in a
given year according to Thompson (2001). Thompson’s measure captures
the risk of armed conflict with a country of significant relative size and mili-
tary strength. It is based on contemporary perceptions by political decision-
makers, gathered through the investigation of historical sources on foreign
policy and diplomacy. Specifically, military rivalries are identified by three
criteria: whether two countries regard each other as “(a) competitors15; (b)
15“Most states are not viewed as competitors–that is, capable of “playing” in the same
league. Relatively weak states are usually capable of interacting competitively only with
states in their immediate neighborhood, thereby winnowing the playing field dramatically.
Stronger actors may move into the neighborhood in threatening ways but without nec-
essarily being perceived, or without perceiving themselves, as genuine competitors. If an
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a source of actual or latent threats that pose some possibility of becoming
militarized; (c) enemies” (see Appendix for details). We also create a mea-
sure of the relative strength of rivals, assessing the probability of winning or
losing a potential military conflict, by gauging the ratio of their respective
army sizes. To this end, we draw military personnel numbers from the COW
National Material Capabilities database.
Political Regimes The political regime is constructed from the institu-
tionalized autocracy and democracy scores in the Polity IV database (polity2
variable), which are themselves combinations of constraints on the executive,
the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and the compet-
itiveness of political participation. The combined score  ranges
from -10 to +10, where a higher score means that country  at date  is more
democratic.
Covariates Finally, our regressions include several control variables. Mil-
itary expenditure and total population are drawn from the COW National
Material Capabilities. Fiscal capacity is proxied by a dummy variable equal
to one whenever the country has a (permanent) income-tax system in a par-
ticular year. Information on the date of introduction of an income tax is
available for 76 countries and comes from Besley and Persson (2011). We
use data for GDP per capita, converted to US dollars, from Penn World
Tables 7.0 and CNTS, as well as measures of government expenditures per
capita from the WDI and CNTS databases.
opponent is too strong to be opposed unilaterally, assistance may be sought from a rival
of the opponent. Other opponents may be regarded more as nuisances or, more neutrally,
as policy problems than as full-fledged competitors or rivals. [...] Threatening enemies
who are also adjudged to be competitors in some sense, as opposed to irritants or simply
problems, are branded as rivals. This categorization is very much a social-psychological
process. Actors interpret the intentions of others based on earlier behavior and forecasts
about the future behavior of these other actors. The interpretation of these intentions leads
to expectations about the likelihood of conflicts escalating to physical attacks. Strategic
rivals anticipate some positive probability of an attack from their competitors over issues
in contention.” (Thompson, 2001)
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3.2 Specifications
Our baseline regression equation is expressed as:
 = 0 + 1  + 2 + (1)
3  ·  + 4 +  +  +  ,
where  refers to the primary enrollment rate in country  and
year . Our main coeﬃcient of interest is 1, which captures the eﬀect of
the war risk faced by country  in year  As explained above, this military
threat is measured either by having had a war some time in the past 10 years
(i.e., between years  − 10 and  − 1) or by having at least one strategic
rival in year  as defined above. We also include , the democ-
racy index in country  at time , and an interaction term between war risk
and democracy, as well as a set of control variables . Finally, and im-
portantly, the specification entails country fixed eﬀects  and year fixed
eﬀects . Hence, the eﬀects we estimate are identified from the variation
over time within countries of the right-hand side variables relative to their
world average levels..
We also estimate the probability of a discrete education reform according
to the following Probit specification:
Pr () = 0 + 1  + 2 + (2)
3  ·  + 4 +  +  +  
where the  variable is either imputed reforms (for the entire sample
of countries) or known reforms (for the historical European sample).
Our main prediction is that the coeﬃcients which capture the eﬀect of
war risk on education policy should be positive. We exclude countries at
war from the sample, as an ongoing war (as opposed to a latent rivalry)
may severely increase the opportunity cost of public funds. Maybe more
importantly, data in times of war may also be unreliable. The expected
coeﬃcient on democracy is not clear a priori. On the one hand, the median
voter in a democracy may be poorer than in an autocracy and thus more
favorable to mass education. On the other hand, a rent-seeking policymaker
in an autocracy may be more likely to appropriate the future benefits of
higher income due to education investments, and therefore more inclined to
incur the cost of educational reforms than a democratic government.
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3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for the annual data underlying the specifications with
continuous primary enrollment (as in (1)) as the left-hand side variables
are shown in Table 2. These data are averaged over 5-year periods for the
specifications with imputed reforms (as in (2)) as the left-hand side variable.
As the table shows, 16% of the country-years in our sample have a war in
the previous 10 years, around 50% are associated with one or more strategic
rivalries, and 4% involve war with another state. Of the country-years in the
sample, about 42% have positive values of the democracy score, with a mean
score of −037. We see a large variance in the severity of war threats either
in terms of the number of casualties in past wars, or in terms of the relative
size of the military in the largest rival (or the sum of rivals) vs. the country
itself.
Table 2 about here
4 Empirical results
4.1 Primary Enrollment Rates
Baseline Results Table 3 shows the results from our baseline estimation
of (1) on the yearly panel, with primary enrollment rates as the dependent
variable and war risk measured by the presence of an ongoing military rivalry.
All specifications include 10-year population growth, to account for varying
shares of school-age children in total population, as well as military expen-
diture per capita, to control for the possibility that military spending may
crowd out education spending. Indeed, we find that high population growth
rates are consistently associated with higher primary enrollment per capita,
while military spending — holding constant the level of external threats —
has a negative coeﬃcient. A natural interpretation of the latter is that fiscal
capacity is limited, so that more eﬀort towards building an army restricts
the ability of the government to invest in mass education.
Column 1 shows that the correlation between rivalry and primary enroll-
ment is positive and significant. In column 2, we add the democracy score.
Interestingly, when faced with the same level of military threats, autocracies
invest more in education than democracies. This finding runs counter to the
median voter view of mass education reforms, which would predict better
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education outcomes in more democratic countries. Also, the coeﬃcient on
military rivalry remains stable as we control for the political regime, which
appears inconsistent with the view that democratization per se would be the
main underlying force behind increases in primary enrollment across coun-
tries. In column 3, we add an interaction term to check if the impact of
rivalries on educational investments diﬀers by political regime. We find that
primary enrollment responds more positively to military threats in democra-
cies than in autocracies. We discuss the democracy results in Subsection 4.3
below.
Covariates In columns 4 and 5, we include the relative strength of rivals,
defined as the military size of the largest rival (column 4) or of the sum of
rivals (column 5), in both cases divided by the size of the country’s own mil-
itary. The point estimates suggest that countries with stronger rivals (i.e.,
with a higher risk of losing a potential war) have higher enrollment rates,
magnifying the eﬀect of war threats for countries more likely to lose war if
a war were to occur. However, this magnification eﬀect is not statistically
significant. Finally, in column 6, we control for total government expendi-
tures per capita. Our main results are unchanged, namely the presence of
a strategic rival is associated with higher enrollment in primary education,
democracies have less primary education, while the interaction between the
democracy indicator and military rivalry is positive. In addition, the relative
strength of rivals is now significantly associated with higher enrollment rates.
Table 3 about here
Past Wars Instead of Rivalries Table 4 presents the same set of regres-
sions, except that we replace military rivalry by the occurrence of a war in
the past 10 years, distinguishing also between won and lost wars. Our main
finding is that primary enrollment responds positively and significantly to a
war in the past 10 years. Systematically, this eﬀect appears stronger if the
war was won than if it was lost. This finding goes against the view that
past wars might favor future education investments because defeats weaken
incumbent elites that might oppose mass education. A higher number of ca-
sualties, gauging the intensity of the recent war, tends to magnify the impact
of recent wars on education, but the coeﬃcient is only significant for wars
won. Consistent with our previous set of results, we find that everything else
equal, autocracies invest more in education than democracies. However, the
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interaction between democracy and past wars now appears to be negative (in
the case of lost wars).
Table 4 about here
4.2 Education Reforms
Next, we consider the eﬀect of war risk on the probability of an educational
reform, based on the probit regression in (2). Table 5 looks at the eﬀects
of military risk or rivalry on imputed reforms (i.e., a 10% or higher increase
in primary enrollment over a five-year period). Consistent with our predic-
tions, we find that a strategic rivalry raises the probability of a large increase
in primary enrollment. However, we find no significant impact of the mil-
itary strength of rivals. The democracy index still enters negatively, and
its interaction with rivalry is positive although not significant, consistent
with the previous tables. Finally, neither population growth, nor total gov-
ernment expenditure, nor military expenditure, show significant coeﬃcients
when democracy is included in the regression.
Table 5 about here
In Table 6, we study the eﬀect of military threats on known reforms which
broaden access to primary or secondary education. We restrict our attention
to the subsample of 14 European countries for which these data are available
since 1830. The results are weaker than in the previous regressions, which is
not surprising with such a small number of countries. In particular, we find
no eﬀect of democracy and its interaction with rivalry. But our main findings
still hold: a significant positive eﬀect of rivalry, or rival’s military strength,
on the probability of observing a reform in primary or secondary education,
once we control for democracy.
Table 6 about here
4.3 The Political Regime
Our estimates are striking in that they imply that democratic countries invest
less in primary education and pursue less education reforms than autocratic
countries, absent rivalries or war threats. However, the gap between democ-
racies and autocracies narrows when war risk is high.
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The nature of the political system may aﬀect education policy along sev-
eral channels. As mentioned already in the introduction, extending the fran-
chise might foster policies in the interest of the poor, which may include
publicly funded primary schooling. But we find little evidence supporting
this hypothesis.16 A prospective mechanism leading in the opposite direction
is that democratically elected leaders have higher turnover — and therefore
supposedly shorter time horizons — than autocrats, which may make the for-
mer less willing to invest in mass-education policies with mainly long-term
benefits. A third channel could conceivably run through the eﬀect of rivalries
and wars on regime change: wars might aﬀect education spending mainly be-
cause they promote regime change, which in turn aﬀects education policy.
However, our findings do not support this idea, since the direct estimates of
military rivalry on education remains unchanged when we hold constant the
political regime. Instead, our results suggest that war threats or past wars
tilt the preferences of the elite towards mass education, even in autocratic
regimes where more schooling might imply a higher risk of the leader being
ousted.
While the positive interaction eﬀect is an intriguing finding which remains
to be understood, our results thus suggest that military competition between
states has played a more important role for the emergence of mass education
than has democratization. (Section 5 below gives an attempt of a theoretical
rationalization.)
Disaggregating Democracy But maybe the concept of democracy is too
broadbrush to help us understand the mechanisms at work. To make further
progress, we try to disentangle the eﬀects of two main components of the
democracy score: constraints on the executive and the openness of executive
recruitment. In Table 7, we thus run our main specifications, letting each
of these two aspects of democracy enter separately on the right hand side.
Specifically, we use constraints on the executive (xconst) in the Polity IV
database, which takes values between 1 and 7, and openness of executive
recruitment (xropen) in the same database, which takes values between 1
and 4.
Panel A looks at the eﬀect on primary enrollment with military rivalry
as the measure of war risk. The estimates in Columns 1 and 3 show that
16As mentioned earlier, Bursztyn (2011) questions the impact of democratization on
education spending based on the Brazilian example.
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executive openness is negatively correlated with the enrollment rate, while
executive constraints are not. However, when we introduce interaction terms
between rivalry and one particular aspect of democracy in Columns 2 and
4, both direct eﬀects are negative and significant. The interactions with
rivalry are both positive and statistically significant. In Columns 5 and 6,
we perform a horse race between the two measures of democracy, with or
without our interaction terms. The estimates show that the direct influence
of each component of democracy remains, albeit with a larger interaction
term for executive openness.
Panel B considers the same specifications as Panel A, but with the prob-
ability of an imputed reform replacing primary enrollment as the dependent
variable. In columns 1 and 3, constraints on the executive as well as openness
of recruitment are negatively and significantly correlated with education re-
forms. When looking at interactions between rivalry and these two measures
of democracy in columns 2 and 4, however, none of the interactions comes
out significant.
Overall, both measures of democracy appear to have a negative and sig-
nificant direct eﬀect, regardless of how we measure mass education. Results
for the interaction eﬀects are somewhat less clear. Taken together, the disag-
gregated results do not shed all that much light on the underlying mechanism
whereby political regimes influence mass education.
Table 7 about here
4.4 Instrumental Variables Estimation
We have established a positive relationship between military rivalry and
primary education outcomes, as well as a positive interaction between ri-
valry and democracy. Still, there might be concerns regarding the direction
of causality. More educated countries may be more prone to have rival-
ries for other reasons than the hypothesized eﬀect of primary education on
their military eﬃciency. To disentangle the direction of causality, we use
an instrumental-variables approach with two diﬀerent instruments, both of
which rely on the regional context in which rivalries are embedded.
Commodity-Price Approach Our first IV-approach relies on data for
commodity prices. Positive shocks to the price of natural resources or agri-
cultural commodities likely foster rivalries, as states will compete for control
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of more valuable resources. We do not use shocks aﬀecting a country’s own
commodity prices, which may aﬀect education through other channels than
the emergence of rivalries, e.g., through their eﬀect on the fiscal balance. In-
stead, our instrument is constructed exclusively from shocks to neighboring
countries, which are the most likely potential rivals. The total commodity
price shock variable, available for 155 countries over the period 1960-2000,
comes from Aghion et al. (2010). It is a composite measure calculated from
yearly changes in the prices of 42 commodity categories, weighted by their
average shares in the country’s total exports in 1985-1987. For each country
, we define our instrument shock_contig  as the fraction of its bordering
countries that experienced a positive commodity price shock of more than
one standard deviation in year . We include shock_contig and up to three
lags of this variable as instruments in the first stage. In the second stage, we
control for the country’s own commodity price shock (again, set equal to 1
if the shock is above one standard deviation in a given year). This is to rule
out that the exclusion restriction is violated because of correlated commod-
ity prices, due to similar crop choices (soil qualities) and mineral availability
among neighboring countries.
The main results of the IV estimation are shown in Table 8. The first
stage is a Probit regression for the likelihood of observing a strategic rivalry.
We see from these regressions that current or recent positive commodity
price shocks in neighboring countries do raise the probability of engaging
in a strategic rivalry. (We have tested for more lags, results not reported,
and found only non-significant coeﬃcients after year 3.) In the second stage,
we confirm a positive eﬀect of rivalry on primary education and a negative
eﬀect of the democracy score. In columns 1 and 2, we run the regression
without fixed eﬀects. We find that rivalry has a positive and significant eﬀect
on primary enrollment rates. Surprisingly, the coeﬃcient on the democracy
(polity2) score turns out positive. However, when we include country and
year fixed eﬀects in columns 3 and 4, the same regressions yield a negative
coeﬃcient on democracy, indicating that the positive correlation was due to
time-invariant country characteristics. The coeﬃcients on military rivalry
remain positive, significant and larger than their OLS counterparts. These
IV results lend support to our claim that causality runs from military threats
to education policies rather than from education levels to the aggressiveness
of foreign policy.
Table 8 about here
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Rivalries Approach Our second IV-approach relies more directly on the
strategic rivalries data. It captures the exogenous component, from the per-
spective of a given country, of the competition between its neighbors. Specif-
ically, this instrument rivalry_contig is constructed, for each country , from
rivalries of a neighboring state  with other countries . For country  ri-
valry_contig is defined as the number of rivalries between bordering states
 and other countries  6= , weighted by the inverse of the distance between
the countries  and  in year . In this calculation, we restrict attention to
neighbors  which are not too small or too large relative to country  to be
credible rivals, using the criterion that neighbors must have at least 30% of
the population of country  and vice versa. Hence, rivalry_contig measures
how prone the immediate regional environment of country  is to military
rivalries. We also use the interaction of rivalry_contig and the democracy
(polity2) score to instrument for the interaction term between military threats
and democracy.
Table 9, panel A shows the estimates of the first-stage regressions. They
show that rivalry_contig has predictive power for the probability that a
country is engaged in a strategic rivalry, and its interaction with the democ-
racy score is positively and significantly associated with the interaction of
rivalry and democracy. The F-tests confirm that our instruments are not
weak. Panel B of the table displays the second-stage estimates. In columns
1 and 2, the first stage is a probit regression for the probability of rivalry. In
columns 3 to 5, the first stage is a OLS regressions of rivalry and its inter-
action with democracy on our instruments and controls. The IV regressions
show again a positive and significant eﬀect of rivalry on primary enrollment
rates, as well as a negative direct coeﬃcient on democracy and a positive and
significant interaction term.
These regressions exclude Western European countries, because our in-
strument does not capture adequately the historical determinants of rivalry
in Western Europe. Most European countries in our sample were involved in
treaties or alliances throughout the period considered. This makes it hard to
believe that country  would not directly interact with third parties  that a
neighboring country  face as rivals — such direct interaction between  and
 would violate the exclusion restriction. It may also be that states involved
in other rivalries did not raise the external threat perception of bordering
countries, if they were bound together by alliances. Indeed, the simple cor-
relation between the instrument and rivalry is positive and significant in all
other regions, but negative in Western Europe suggesting that rivalries in
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this area are of a diﬀerent nature.17.
Tables 9 about here
4.5 Robustness Checks
In this section, we run a series of robustness checks to test the validity of our
baseline results.
Industrialization and Urbanization First, democracy may be corre-
lated with the level of industrialization and urbanization. If an educated
military is more valuable in more industrialized countries, where the army
requires more skills, we may be concerned that our interaction term between
rivalry and democracy is picking up this eﬀect. In Table 10, we add as
control variables several measures of industrial development and their in-
teraction with rivalry: the share of industrial activities in GDP (available
for 1946-2000), the share of population living in cities of 50,000 or more
inhabitants, and the share of population living in cities of 20,000 or more
inhabitants (drawn from Banks, 2011).
Most importantly, our results on democracy are unchanged: its direct
coeﬃcient is negative, its interaction with rivalry is positive, and both are
significant. Moreover, as expected, more industrialized and more urbanized
countries have higher rates of primary enrollment. Interestingly, we do find
that enrollment responds more to military threats in countries with a larger
share of industrial activities and a larger share of urban population. For
a country which has a score of 0 on the polity2 scale, the point estimates
suggest that the eﬀect of military rivalry on primary education becomes
positive around a 20% share of industry in value added, or around a 10%
share of population living in cities of at least 50,000 people. In short, rivalry is
positively associated with primary enrollment except for the least urbanized
and least industrialized countries.
Table 10 about here
17As it turns out, including Western European countries into this regression leads to
coeﬃcients on rivalry that are about ten times higher than those in Table 9, Panel B.
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Other Covariates and Sample Selection We perform several other ro-
bustness tests on our baseline specification in Table 11. In column 1, we
include the index of ethnic fractionalization from Alesina et al. (2003), as
well as its interaction with rivalry. Ethnic diversity has been shown to aﬀect
the amount of social spending and in particular education investment. We
find that more fractionalized countries have higher enrollment rates, but the
eﬀect of rivalry on primary enrollment decreases with ethnic fractionaliza-
tion. Yet, our main coeﬃcients remain unaﬀected. In column 2, we include
the primary enrollment rate of the rival. Consistent with our intuition, the
results show that countries increase their enrollment rates more when their
rivals have more educated populations, and therefore presumably more ef-
fective armies. In column 3, we add 10-year lagged enrollment to control
for initial conditions. As expected, primary enrollment displays high serial
autocorrelation, but our main coeﬃcients of interest are unchanged. In col-
umn 4, we check that our results do not reflect an entirely European story
by excluding Western Europe from the sample. Again, our results are robust
to this change, and the coeﬃcients on rivalry actually increase. In column 5,
we account for the possibility that country-specific factors may vary over the
sample period, by interacting country fixed eﬀects with dummies for before
and after 1950. Finally in column 6, we add continent-specific time trends to
the regression. Each time we find that primary enrollment rates are higher,
all things equal, in countries engaged in a military rivalry, and that the eﬀect
of a rivalry is stronger in more democratic countries.
Table 11 about here
Alternative Measure of Education We also compare our baseline re-
sults with those obtained with an alternative measure of primary schooling,
namely education attainment from the Barro-Lee (2010) data set, available
at five-year intervals for the postwar period only. We run the specifications
of (1), using as the dependent variable the amount of primary education
achieved by adults in the 15-19 age span at year + 5, starting in 1950. Ta-
ble 12 presents the results. Since education attainment is defined per person
of the relevant age group, we do not need to control for population growth in
these specifications. We find similar results to those in Table 3 — a (weakly)
positive eﬀect of rivalry, a negative eﬀect of democracy, and a positive inter-
action term. The results are somewhat weaker with the recent occurrence of
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an external war as the threat variable, but the positive eﬀect of a recent war
is significant.
Table 12 about here
Military Expenditures As a check that education investments are indeed
driven by military concerns, we also run our baseline regression replacing ed-
ucation with military expenditure per capita as the left-hand side variable.
As we can see in Table 13, we find the same pattern for military spend-
ing as we did for primary education enrollment: military spending responds
positively to strategic rivalries and it is higher in less democratic countries.
Table 13 about here
Education as a Means to Win Future Wars The motive for investing
in mass education in our narrative above, as well as our theory below, is that
a more educated population is more eﬀective at fighting wars. If we regress
the probability of winning the next war, conditional on a war outbreak in
the next 10 years, we do find that it is positively and significantly associated
with current primary enrollment. The regressions are shown in Table 14.
Together with the historical evidence outlined in Section 2, these findings
support the view that military threats spur investments in mass education
in order to build more eﬀective armies. We also find that primary education
has some predictive power on the probability of observing a war in the near
future.
Table 14 about here
Other Robustness Tests18 We have performed other robustness tests as
well. One is to consider yet another measure of external threats, based on
future conflicts. If countries correctly anticipate war risks, the incidence of
future wars should proxy for military threats ex ante. This proxy is more
vulnerable to endogeneity concerns than our rivalry or past war data, as the
willingness to engage in wars can be influenced by past education levels. De-
spite this word of caution, it provides a useful check to our main hypothesis.
18To save space, we do not show the corresponding regression results. These are available
upon request.
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We run (1), but measure war risk by a binary variable that takes a value of
one if and only if a war breaks out in the following 10 years. Our results are
the same in the basic specification, namely: future wars enter positively in
the enrollment regression, democracy enters negatively, and the interaction
term is positive.
We have also checked the sensitivity of our results to the threshold of
education expansion used to define imputed reforms. Specifically, we have
used thresholds of 5% and 15% expansions in the last five years, instead of
10%. The signs of the coeﬃcients on rivalry and on the democracy score
are similar to those obtained with our baseline specification, although the
interaction term between rivalries and democracy is no longer significant.
Summary of Empirical Findings Taken together, our empirical results
provide robust evidence that in the wake of increased strategic rivalry (or in
reaction to past wars), countries invest more in mass education. Everything
else equal, democracies invest less in primary education than do autocracies.
But the interaction between democracy indicators and military rivalry ap-
pears to be positive, especially when democracy is measured by constraints
on the executive.
5 A Simple Theory
How can we understand the empirical results summarized at the end of the
previous section? This is certainly not obvious, but in this section we propose
a simple theoretical model that may help rationalize our main findings. In line
with the historical discussion and the focus of our empirical work, the model
highlights the prospective role of public education in the eﬃcient operation
of the military.
Basic Setup The formal model we develop borrows in spirit from the
state-capacity framework of Besley and Persson (2009, 2011), from the voter
participation frameworks by Feddersen and Sandroni (2002) and Coate and
Conlin (2004), and from the analysis by Ticchi and Vindigni (2009) of fight-
ing incentives across diﬀerent political regimes. Consider a society, where
the population is normalized to unity and divided into two equally large and
homogenous groups (with regard to education) of risk-neutral individuals,
 =  . There are two time periods. Output per capita in each period —
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equal to total resources and the tax base — is exogenous and constant over
time and normalized to 1
2
 All consumption takes place at the end of the
second period.
One of the groups serves as the incumbent in both periods (thus there
is no political turnover). Among political institutions, we focus on the con-
straints on the executive. These are modeled as a share of output  that
the incumbent group,  must grant to the opposition group,  — thus a
higher value of  captures more democratic institutions in the sense of higher
checks and balances (protecting opposition groups from discretionary redis-
tribution). A war can occur in period 2 with exogenous probability  For
simplicity, all (accumulated) income perishes from the country as a whole —
i.e., to both groups — if a war is lost.
The conditional probability  of winning a war, once it has broken out,
depends on individual eﬀort choices by the members of each group in period
2. Specifically, each individual can expend a unit of eﬀort at an individual
specific utility cost that is decreasing in the level of education  We assume
a very simple cost function  , where variable  is individual-specific and
uniformly distributed on [0 1] in each group. Any individual in group  will
follow a behavioral rule to expend his unit of eﬀort if     where  is the
rule set by group  members, which if followed by all other members of the
group, maximizes the group’s aggregate utility (in Feddersen and Sandroni’s
language, each individual member of group  wants to "do her part" to
maximize the group’s utility).
We assume that the conditional probability of winning the war depends














 +  ) 
where we assume that   1 This formulation assumes that (aggregate)
eﬀorts of the two groups are complementary. This could be for geographical
reasons: if the two groups inhabit diﬀerent parts of the country’s territory,
eﬀort is needed along diﬀerent parts of the border. Another possibility is
that the groups represent an dominant elite from which oﬃcers are drawn
and a large non-elite from which common soldiers are drawn: again, eﬀort is
needed from both groups.
Thus, education in this basic model only serves to cut the cost of each
individual’s perceived fighting eﬀort, but it is straightforward to let output
depend on the level of education (see further below). The level of education
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is chosen by the incumbent group. Specifically, in period 1, the incumbent
group can augment the initial education level, normalized at zero, by invest-
ment  in future education at cost () = , where   1. We study this
choice of education below.
Timing The timing of the model is as follows
1. In period 1, the incumbent makes investment  in future education
2. At the beginning of period 2, a war with a foreign power erupts with
probability 
3. If war has erupted, members of each group choose the behavioral rule
for eﬀort choice, thus setting  and  Individual members of each
group observe the individual component of their eﬀort cost  and then
choose whether to expend one unit of eﬀort at cost  
4. If a war has erupted, it is won with probability 
5. If no war has erupted or a war has been won, the incumbent group
consumes 1−  while the opposition group consumes 
To analyze the model, we proceed by backward induction, starting from
the eﬀort choices at stage 3 and going back to the education choice at stage
1. For simplicity, we assume no time discounting.
Equilibrium Without a behavioral rule for eﬀort choice, individuals would
face a severe free-rider problem similar to the problem of voter participation.
In our setting, individuals choose to expend eﬀort when their utility cost
is low enough. In analogy with the analyses in Feddersen and Sandroni
(2002) and Coate and Conlin (2004), we assume that group members choose
the behavioral rule that maximizes the expected payoﬀ to the group: i.e.,
expected consumption minus the group-wide cost of eﬀort.





























Simple algebra gives us:
 = () 12− and  = ((1− )) 12− .
In equilibrium, the conditional probability of winning a war  becomes19:




 2− + (1− ) 2−
i
.
Moving back to period 1, the incumbent group chooses education invest-
ment  to
max {[(1− ) + 
∗( )](1− )− ()} .
The first-order condition becomes:




−1 = (1− )
2− 
h
 2− + (1− ) 2−
i
 2(−1)2− ,





 2− + (1− ) 2−
i¾ 2−(−1)(2−)+2(1−)  (4)
Equation (4) immediately implies that for  suﬃciently large the expres-




 2− + (1− ) 2−
i
strictly lies between 0 and 1, as
claimed earlier.
Comparative Statics One can now show:
Proposition 1 For  small enough and  large enough that we do not run
into corners, equilibrium investment in education  is increasing in
the risk of war,  and positively aﬀected by the interaction between
democracy  and the risk of war  namely:   0 and 2  0
19Note that we are implicitly assuming an interior solution ∗ ∈ (0 1) This in turn is
guaranteed by assuming  suﬃciently large, which in turn implies that the equilibrium 
is suﬃciently small.
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 2− + (1− ) 2−
i
.
But one can verify that





 2−−1 − (1− ) 2−−1
´
,
where the first term in the RHS of the above equation remains bounded when
 → 0 whereas the second term becomes arbitrarily large. This establishes
the Proposition.
Intuitively, these results of our model capture a relatively simple idea.
Society’s income is (partly) expropriated if a war is lost to a foreign power.
The probability of winning a war depends upon both the educational level
and fighting eﬀorts by members of the incumbent and opposition groups. In
these circumstances, the incumbent group has stronger motives to invest in
education if a war becomes more likely. Absent democracy in the form of
some checks and balances, however, opposition-group members do not benefit
a great deal from the economy’s resources. Therefore, they have weaker
incentives to exert fighting eﬀort than members of the incumbent group —
this mechanism is similar to the one in Ticchi and Vindigni (2009). If the
eﬀorts by the incumbent and opponent groups are suﬃciently complementary
(  1), this incentive gap may lower the prospects of winning a war to such
an extent that investments in education respond less to a higher war threat
in autocracies than in democracies.
As it stands, the above model does not predict diﬀerent signs for the direct
eﬀect of democracy on education  and the interaction eﬀect 2  However,
once we allow output  to also depend positively on education, then the
direct eﬀect of democracy can become negative. For example, suppose that
 = () = 1 +  with  small For small enough  it is still the case (by
continuity) that for suﬃciently low  :   0 and 2  0 But in addition,
we also obtain   0. To see the latter, note that in the extended model,
the first-order condition for  becomes




where 0() =   0








Clearly, education is now decreasing in democracy parameter  By continu-
ity, the results remains true for  suﬃciently small.
Intuitively, democracy has a direct negative eﬀect on the motives to in-
vest in education, simply because stronger checks and balances reduce the
incumbent’s residual claim on the additional output generated by education.
An Auxiliary Prediction The unverifiable and complementary decisions
on fighting eﬀort by the two groups are the drivers of the model’s positive in-
teraction eﬀect between military threats and democracy. But for other types
of physical investments, their contribution to military success presumably
depend less on such eﬀorts. Following this logic, military rivalry might aﬀect
other measures of state capacity such as infrastructure, but the interaction
between rivalry and democracy should be less significant. We confront this
auxiliary prediction of the model with data on the length of paved roads from
Calderón and Servén (2010), which covers 97 countries over the period 1960-
2000. Table 15 shows the results of estimating our main specification with
the yearly percentage change in the length of paved roads as the left-hand
side variable. While military rivalries still drive this type of investment, we
find no eﬀect — neither directly nor through the interaction term — of the
political regime on road-building.
Table 15 about here
6 Conclusion
We have argued that military rivalry is an important factor behind coun-
tries’ decisions to invest in mass primary education. Democratization does
not seem to play an important role, even though primary enrollment appears
to respond more to threats in democracies than in autocracies. Moreover,
a more severe war, as measured by a higher number of casualties, tends to
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magnify the impact of recent wars on education, whereas the impact of mil-
itary rivalry on primary education is larger in more industrialized countries
and in those facing stronger and more educated rivals.
Our approach could be extended in several directions. A first would be
to investigate if economic rivalry — e.g., measured by trade competition —
has a similar eﬀect on education policies as military rivalry. A second di-
rection would be to endogenize fiscal capacity and in particular look at how
much current or past military rivalry aﬀects future fiscal capacity. Yet, an-
other would be to consider not only the size of primary enrollment, but also
the governance of primary (and secondary) schools. Recent work by Algan,
Cahuc and Shleifer (2011) distinguishes vertical and horizontal school ped-
agogy, where the former relies heavily upon taking notes from the teacher,
whereas the latter involves group interactions among students. Our con-
jecture is that primary-education reforms primarily driven by past military
rivalry, should put vertical systems in place, which may prevail still today.
This and other extensions are left for future research.
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A Data Appendix: Strategic Rivalries
Thompson (2001) lists the following qualitative coding rules to define strate-
gic rivalries and their duration for the period 1816-1999:
1. “Strategic rivals must be independent states, as determined by Gled-
itsch and Ward’s (1999) inventory of independent states.
2. Beginning and ending dates are keyed as much as possible to the timing
of evidence about the onset of explicit threat, competitor, and enemy
perceptions on the part of decision-makers. Historical analyses, for
instance, often specify that decision-makers were unconcerned about
a competitor prior to some year just as they also provide reasonably
specific information about the timing of rapprochements and whether
they were meaningful ones or simply tactical maneuvers. (...)
As a general rule, the competitor criterion restricts rivalries to their own
class within the major-minor power distinction. Major (minor) power
rivalries are most likely to involve two major (minor) powers. Definitely,
there are exceptions to this rule. Major-minor power rivalries emerge
when minor powers become something more than nuisances in the eyes
of major power decision-makers. Capability asymmetry may still be
quite pronounced but that does not mean that the major power is in
a position to, or is inclined toward, the use of its capability advantage.
(...)
3. No minimal duration is stipulated in advance (...)
4. Various constituencies within states may have diﬀerent views about
who their state’s main rivals are or should be. Unless they control the
government, constituency views are not considered the same as those of
the principal decisionmakers. If the principal decision-makers disagree
about the identity of rivals, the operational problem then becomes one
of assessing where foreign policy-making is most concentrated. (...)
5. If two states were not considered rivals prior to the outbreak of war,
they do not become rivals during the war unless their rivalry extends
beyond the period of war combat. This rule is designed to avoid com-
plications in assessing the linkages between rivalry and intensive forms
of conflict. (...)
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6. One needs to be especially skeptical about dating rivalry terminations.
Some rivalries experience short-lived and highly publicized rapproche-
ments that turn out to be less meaningful than one might have thought
from reading the relevant press accounts at the time. Some rivalries
enter long periods of hibernation only to erupt suddenly as if nothing
had changed. All of these situations may share the outward appear-
ance of rivalry termination. What needs to be manifested is evidence
of some explicit kind of a significant de-escalation in threat perceptions
and hostility. (...)
7. The most valuable sources for information pertinent to identifying
strategic rivalry are political histories of individual state’s foreign policy
activities.”
B Data Appendix: Primary Enrollment, Wars
and Democratization
This Appendix presents the data underlying Table 1. For each of the 53
countries for which we have more than 40 years of education data, we list (i)
the 20-year period with the highest observed increase in primary enrollment
rates; (ii) the date, if any, in which the country became a democracy as
measured by crossing the threshold of 6 in the polity2 scale; (iii) the wars in
which the country was engaged in the 20 years prior to the observed surge
in primary education.
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Country Availability of data on primary enrollment rate
Education reform period
 (20-year period with greatest increase 
in primary enrollment)
Date of democractic transition (*)
Rivalries and wars starting in a 20-year 
period before education reform (**)
Afghanistan 1946-1998 1946-1966 Always < 6
Second Afghan Anti-Reform War of 1928-1937 (intra-state)
Strategic rivalry with Iran, 1816-1929
Strategic rivalry with Pakistan, 1947–1979
Second World War of 1939-1945
Albania 1919-1998 1934-1954 2002
Strategic rivalry with Greece, 1913-1987
First World War of 1914-1918
Argentina 1882-1998 1889-1919 1983
Lopez War of 1864-1870
Fourth Argentina War of 1870-1871 (intra state)
Fifth Argentina War of 1874 (intra state)
Argentine Indians War of 1879-1880 (intra state)
Belgium 1860-1980 1889-1919 1853 None
Bolivia 1882-1981 1882-1902 1982
War of the Pacific of 1879-1883
Bolivia-Criollos War of 1870-1871 (intra state war)
Brazil 1868-1981 1946-1966 1985 Second World War of 1939-1945
Bulgaria 1889-1985 1889-1909 1990
Bosnia and Bulgaria Revolt of 1875-1876 (intra state war)
Serbian-Bulgarian War of 1885
Strategic rivalry with Greece 1878-1953
Strategic rivalry with Romania 1878-1945
Strategic rivalry with Turkey 1878-1950
Strategic rivalry with Yugoslavia 1878-1954
Canada 1865-1980 1946-1966 1888 Second World War of 1939-1945
Korean War of 1950-1953
Chile 1882-1980 1893-1913 1965 War of the Pacific of 1879-1883
China 1919-1998 1938-1958 Always < 6
Manchurian War of 1929
Intra-Guomindang War of 1929-1930 (intra state war)
Second Sino-Japanese War of 1931-
Third Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1941
Columbia 1886-1980 1893-1913 1867 None
Costa Rica 1882-1980 1946-1966 1875 Second World War of 1939-1945
Cuba 1902-1980 1954-1974 Always < 6 Second World War of 1939-1945
Czechoslovakia 1919-1992 1943-1963 > 6 in 1918 No data
Denmark 1882-1980 1882-1902 1911 Second Schleswig-Holstein War of 1864
Dominican Republic 1865-1980 1900-1920 1978 None in dataset
Ecuador 1886-1980 1946-1966 1979 Second World War of 1939-1945
Finland 1919-1980 1919-1939 > 6 in 1918 Kinship Wars from 1918-1920
France 1815-1981 1827-1847 1876 Franco-Spanish War of 1823
Germany 1867-1939 1867-1887 1919 Second Schleswig-Holstein War of 1864
Greece 1860-1980 1913-1933 1864
Greco-Turkish War of 1897
First Balkan War of 1912-1913
Guatemala 1882-1980 1947-1967 1996 Second World War of 1939-1945
Haiti 1905-1981 1907-1927 1990 Strategic Rivalry with the United States 1891–1915
Honduras 1882-1980 1946-1966 1982 Second World War of 1939-1945
Hungary 1919-1980 1926-1946 1990
First World War of 1914-1918
Hungarian Adversaries War of 1919
Iran 1889-1980 1889-1909 Always < 6 None
(*) The democratic transition is identified as the first year in which the PolityIV index reached 6.
     (when the PolityIV index is greater than 6 at the beginning of the PolityIV sample, the cell indicates: >6 in beginning date of sample )
(**) Wars are identified from the Correlates of War database; strategic rivalries are identified from Thompson (2001).
Country Availability of data on primary enrollment rate
Education reform period
 (20-year period with greatest increase 
in primary enrollment)
Date of democractic transition (*)
Rivalries and wars starting in a 20-year 
period before education reform (**)
Ireland 1922-1980 1946-1966 Above 6 in 1922 Second World War of 1939-1945
Italy 1882-1980 1889-1919 1947 First Italian-Ethiopian War of 1887
Japan 1867-1998 1867-1887 1952
Convention of Kanagawa of 1854 (with US)
Anglo-Japanese Friendship Treaty of 1854
Treaty of Shimoda of 1855 (with Russia)
United-States Japan Treat of Amity and Commerce of 1858
Treaty of Amity and Commerce between France and Japan of 1858
Liberia 1887-1980 1946-1966 2006 Second World War of 1939-1945
Luxemburg 1886-1981 1926-1946 No data First World War of 1914-1918
Mexico 1882-1980 1919-1939 1997
Third Mexican War of 1910-1914
First World War of 1914-1918
Mongolia 1926-1980 1930-1950 1992 Conquest of Mongolia of 1920-1921
Netherlands 1857-1980 1899-1919 1917 First Dutch-Achinese War of 1873-1878
New Zealand 1907-1980 1946-1966 Above 6 in 1907 Second World War of 1939-1945
Nicaragua 1902-1980 1939-1959 1990 No data
Norway 1830-1981 1960-1980 1898
Second World War of 1939-1945
Enduring rivalry with Russia 1956–1987
Panama 1903-1980 1906-1926 1989
Panama seceded from Colombia with the 
backing of the United States in 1903
Paraguay 1882-1980 1882-1902 1992 Lopez War of 1864-1870
Peru 1886-1980 1930-1950 1980 First World War of 1914-1918
Poland 1919-1980 1946-1966 Above 6 in 1918 Second World War of 1939-1945
Portugal 1854-1980 1854-1874 1911 No data
Romania 1882-1980 1893-1913 1996 None
Spain 1859-1980 1919-1939 1900
Second Spanish-Moroccan War of 1909-1910
First World War of 1914-1918
Sweden 1882-1980 1939-1959 1914 None
Switzerland 1880-1982 1939-1959 Above 10 in 1880 No
Thailand 1887-1980 1919-1939 1992 First World War of 1914-1918
Turkey 1886-1980 1886-1906 1960 Second Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878
United Kingdom 1860-1980 1860-1880 1880
Second British-Burmese War of 1852
Crimean War of 1853-1856
Anglo-Persian War of 1856-1857
Indian Mutiny of 1857-1859
United States 1825-1982 1860-1880 1809 Mexican-American War of 1846-1847
Uruguay 1882-1980 1946-1966 1952 Second World War of 1939-1945
Venezuela 1886-1980 1919-1939 1958 First World War of 1914-1939
Yugoslavia 1919-1980 1930-1950 2000 First World War of 1914-1939
(*) The democratic transition is identified as the first year in which the PolityIV index reached 6.
     (when the PolityIV index is greater than 6 at the beginning of the PolityIV sample, the cell indicates: >6 in beginning date of sample )
(**) Wars are identified from the Correlates of War database; strategic rivalries are identified from Thompson (2001).
Table 1: Education Surge, Democratization and War:
Historical Episodes
Country Greatest increase in Democratization in War in preceding
primary enrollment preceding 20 years? 20 years?
Afghanistan 1946-1966 No Yes
Albania 1934-1954 No Yes
Argentina 1889-1919 No Yes
Belgium 1889-1919 No No
Bolivia 1882-1902 No Yes
Brazil 1946-1966 No Yes
Bulgaria 1889-1909 No Yes
Canada 1946-1966 No Yes
Chile 1893-1913 No Yes
China 1938-1958 No Yes
Columbia 1893-1913 No No
Costa Rica 1946-1966 No Yes
Cuba 1954-1974 No Yes
Czechoslovakia 1943-1963 No No data
Denmark 1882-1902 No Yes
Dominican Republic 1900-1920 No No data
Ecuador 1946-1966 No Yes
Finland 1919-1939 Yes Yes
France 1827-1847 No Yes
Germany 1867-1887 No Yes
Greece 1913-1933 No Yes
Guatemala 1947-1967 No Yes
Haiti 1907-1927 No Yes
Honduras 1946-1966 No Yes
Hungary 1926-1946 No Yes
Iran 1889-1909 No No
Ireland 1946-1966 No Yes
Italy 1889-1919 No Yes
Japan 1867-1887 No Yes
Liberia 1946-1966 No Yes
Luxembourg 1926-1946 No data Yes
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Country Greatest increase in Democratization in War in preceding
primary enrollment preceding 20 years? 20 years?
Mexico 1919-1939 No Yes
Mongolia 1930-1950 No Yes
Netherlands 1899-1919 No Yes
New Zealand 1946-1966 No Yes
Nicaragua 1939-1959 No No data
Norway 1960-1980 No Yes
Panama 1906-1926 No Yes
Paraguay 1882-1902 No Yes
Peru 1930-1950 No Yes
Poland 1946-1966 No Yes
Portugal 1854-1874 No No data
Romania 1893-1913 No No
Spain 1919-1939 Yes Yes
Sweden 1939-1959 No No
Switzerland 1939-1959 No No
Thailand 1919-1939 No Yes
Turkey 1886-1906 No Yes
United Kingdom 1860-1880 No Yes
United States 1860-1880 No Yes
Uruguay 1946-1966 No Yes
Venezuela 1919-1939 No Yes
Yugoslavia 1930-1950 No Yes
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Table 2: Summary Statistics (yearly data)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Enrollment per 10,000 6939 1052.99 528.29 1 3023
Rivalry 6939 0.496 0.500 0 1
Rel. army largest rival 6359 1.106 2.777 0 56
Rel. army total rivals 6359 1.653 4.303 0 59
War in previous 10 years 6939 0.159 0.366 0 1
Lost war casualties 6939 0.033 0.281 0 7.932
Won war casualties 6939 0.028 0.214 0 3.922
Polity2 6939 -0.369 7.116 -10 10
Population growth (10 yrs) 5401 19.31 14.89 -53.65 178.52
Military expenditure p.c. 6194 48.11 218.98 0 7398.57
Govt expenditure p.c. 6362 161.97 538.71 031 8402.08
Income tax 4207 0.681 0.466 0 1
GDP p.c. 4150 1563.04 3543.89 18 38344.9
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Table 3: Primary Enrollment and Military Rivalry
Rate of primary enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rivalry 55.843*** 54.922*** 94.242*** 78.431*** 77.437*** 63.460***
[17.537] [17.820] [17.891] [19.905] [19.798] [20.274]
Polity2 -6.877*** -17.644*** -18.952*** -18.979*** -17.986***
[1.152] [1.474] [1.484] [1.482] [1.499]
Rivalry*Polity2 22.261*** 23.331*** 23.390*** 22.420***
[1.943] [2.064] [2.065] [2.076]
Rel. army largest rival 2.521
[2.672]
Rel. army total rivals 2.157 4.108***
[1.518] [1.544]
Govt expenditure p.c. -0.250***
[0.014]
Population growth. 9.033*** 9.423*** 8.811*** 9.807*** 9.808*** 8.962***
[0.473] [0.489] [0.485] [0.545] [0.545] [0.544]
Military expenditure p.c. -0.885*** -0.898*** -0.885*** -1.150*** -1.148*** -0.337***
[0.049] [0.050] [0.049] [0.061] [0.061] [0.080]
Observations 4849 4636 4636 4285 4285 3995
R-squared 0.675 0.670 0.679 0.697 0.698 0.722
All specifications include country and time fixed eﬀects and standard errors clustered by country.
Standard errors in brackets. *** p0.01, ** p0.05, * p0.1
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Table 4: Primary Enrollment and Recent Wars
Rate of primary enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
War in 92.726*** 101.734*** 105.710***
previous 10 years [15.173] [15.627] [15.915]
Won war in 123.198*** 105.674*** 89.445***
previous 10 years [20.713] [21.603] [20.997]
Lost war in 71.446*** 60.262*** 26.721
previous 10 years [20.142] [21.232] [21.548]
Polity2 -7.262*** -6.915*** -6.897*** -7.254*** -6.119***
[1.148] [1.177] [1.178] [1.149] [1.147]






Won war casualties 65.060** 73.110***
[27.147] [27.568]
Lost war casualties 2.141 -6.476
[26.933] [28.124]
Govt. exp. p.c. -0.275***
[0.013]
Population growth. 9.191*** 9.575*** 9.545*** 9.475*** 9.597*** 8.828***
[0.472] [0.487] [0.487] [0.490] [0.487] [0.487]
Military expenditure p.c. -0.900*** -0.916*** -0.921*** -0.911*** -0.909*** -0.107
[0.049] [0.050] [0.050] [0.050] [0.050] [0.067]
Observations 4849 4636 4636 4636 4636 4307
R-squared 0.677 0.672 0.672 0.673 0.673 0.702
All specifications include country and time fixed eﬀects and standard errors clustered by country.
Standard errors in brackets. *** p0.01, ** p0.05, * p0.1
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Table 5: Imputed Education Reforms and Military Rivalry
Probit for “imputed reforms”
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rivalry 0.271** 0.177 0.190* 0.347** 0.379*** 0.374**
[0.119] [0.113] [0.113] [0.145] [0.145] [0.148]
Polity2 -0.055*** -0.059*** -0.062*** -0.061*** -0.065***
[0.007] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011]
Rivalry*Polity2 0.009 0.013 0.013 0.019
[0.014] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017]
Rel. army largest rival 0.007
[0.029]
Rel. army total rivals -0.005 -0.000
[0.019] [0.019]
Govt expenditure p.c. 0.000
[0.000]
Population growth. 0.009*** 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Military expenditure p.c. -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 1390 1299 1299 1163 1163 1099
All specifications include time fixed eﬀects and standard errors clustered by country.
Standard errors in brackets. *** p0.01, ** p0.05, * p0.1
49
Table 6: Known Education Reforms and Military Rivalry
Probit for “known reforms”
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rivalry 0.233*** 0.235** 0.283* -0.036 -0.111 -0.021
[0.085] [0.092] [0.144] [0.234] [0.237] [0.213]
Polity2 0.005 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000
[0.013] [0.013] [0.023] [0.023] [0.022]
Rivalry*Polity2 0.033 0.040 0.028
[0.034] [0.034] [0.026]
Rel. army largest rival 0.107***
[0.024]
Rel. army total rivals 0.074*** 0.095***
[0.016] [0.018]
Govt expenditure p.c. 0.000 0.000
[0.001] [0.001]
Population growth -0.001 -0.000 -0.009 0.006 0.009 0.009
[0.009] [0.009] [0.016] [0.008] [0.008] [0.013]
Military expenditure p.c. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
Observations 881 880 826 852 852 798
S.E. clustered by country. Standard errors in brackets. *** p0.01, ** p0.05, * p0.1
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Table 7: Components of Democracy
Panel A
Primary enrollment rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rivalry 62.892*** -67.565** 71.757*** -181.294*** 67.273*** -307.087***
[18.252] [28.332] [20.721] [63.734] [20.736] [65.719]
Exec. constraints 2.782 -17.572*** 14.630*** -12.974**
[3.658] [4.977] [4.373] [5.664]
Exec. const.*Rivalry 36.400*** 48.978***
[6.064] [6.678]
Exec. openness -41.348*** -80.415*** -48.924*** -73.776***
[10.071] [13.697] [10.309] [13.800]
Exec. open.*Rivalry 71.590*** 50.794***
[17.056] [17.115]
Population growth 9.653*** 9.246*** 9.741*** 9.615*** 9.543*** 9.023***
[0.503] [0.505] [0.537] [0.536] [0.539] [0.538]
Military expenditure p.c. -0.847*** -0.843*** -0.835*** -0.822*** -0.817*** -0.800***
[0.051] [0.050] [0.051] [0.051] [0.052] [0.051]
Observations 4481 4481 3995 3995 3995 3995
R-squared 0.671 0.674 0.673 0.674 0.674 0.680
All specifications include country and time fixed eﬀects and standard errors clustered by country.
Standard errors in brackets. *** p0.01, ** p0.05, * p0.1
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Panel B
Probability of “imputed reforms”
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rivalry 0.257** 0.257** 0.316** 0.322** 0.317** 0.322**
[0.122] [0.122] [0.130] [0.130] [0.131] [0.131]
Exec. constraints -0.006* -0.007 -0.001 -0.000
[0.003] [0.005] [0.008] [0.010]
Exec. const.*Rivalry 0.003 0.000
[0.007] [0.015]
Exec. openness -0.006** -0.007* -0.004 -0.007
[0.003] [0.004] [0.006] [0.008]
Exec.open*Rivalry 0.004 0.003
[0.005] [0.012]
Population growth 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Military expenditure p.c. -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 1303 1303 1198 1198 1198 1198
All specifications include time fixed eﬀects and standard errors clustered by country.
Standard errors in brackets. *** p0.01, ** p0.05, * p0.1
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Table 8: IV — Commodity-Price Approach
Primary enrollment rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rivalry 799.292* 671.247*** 292.107 290.874**
[434.690] [207.962] [209.645] [132.882]
Polity2 6.879*** 6.453*** -8.434*** -6.692***
[1.426] [1.557] [1.258] [1.340]
Military expenditure p.c. -0.023 -0.064* -0.134*** -0.124***
[0.035] [0.038] [0.025] [0.028]
Own country shock 2.846 -9.588 53.349***
[41.559] [38.961] [18.769]
Year fixed eﬀects no no yes yes
Country fixed eﬀects no no yes yes
First stage: rivalry
shock_contig 0.364*** 0.261** 0.364*** 0.261**







Observations 2402 2087 2402 2087
All specifications include country and time FE and SE clustered by country.
Standard errors in brackets. *** p0.01, ** p0.05, * p0.1
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Table 9: IV — Regional-Rivalry Approach
Panel A: First stage
Rivalry Rivalry Rivalry Rivalry Rivalry*polity2
Probit Probit OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rivalry_contig 15.815*** 16.024*** 13.514*** 13.493*** -30.028*
[2.654] [2.700] [1.737] [1.733] [15.927]
Polity2 0.007** -0.001 0.001 0.487***
[0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.012]
Rivalry_contig*polity2 -0.564*** 17.403***
[0.163] [1.496]
Observations 3455 3379 3379 3379 3379
R-squared 0.772 0.773 0.825
F statistic 1450.28 1401.31 900.28
Other coeﬃcients not reported. Standard errors in brackets. *** p0.01, ** p0.05, * p0.1
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Panel B: Second stage
Primary enrollment rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rivalry 331.629 277.712 242.998 325.646* 492.938***
[266.452] [271.384] [147.834] [167.145] [187.981]
Polity2 -0.508 -0.448 -20.727** -20.454**
[1.189] [1.376] [8.985] [8.247]
Rivalry*Polity2 36.408** 37.543***
[15.819] [14.482]
Gov’t expenditure p.c. -0.399***
[0.049]
Population growth 7.570*** 7.809*** 7.688*** 6.829*** 5.607***
[0.441] [0.452] [0.725] [0.833] [0.769]
Military expenditure p.c. -0.579*** -0.574*** -0.585*** -0.605*** 0.230*
[0.048] [0.048] [0.106] [0.109] [0.138]
Endogenous variables rivalry rivalry rivalry rivalry, rivalry,
rivalry*polity2 rivalry*polity2
First stage Probit Probit OLS OLS OLS
Observations 3455 3379 3379 3379 3164
All specifications include country and time FE and standard errors clustered by country.
Standard errors in brackets. *** p0.01, ** p0.05, * p0.1. Western Europe excluded.
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Table 10: Robustness: Industrialization and Urbanization
Primary enrollment rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rivalry 60.902*** -148.555*** 150.333*** -154.856*** 118.140*** -254.160***
[17.728] [32.812] [15.924] [24.782] [16.255] [26.133]
Polity2 -8.452*** -9.117*** -19.069*** -10.909*** -20.662*** -11.825***
[1.472] [1.462] [1.359] [1.423] [1.377] [1.423]
Rivalry*polity2 5.621*** 5.973*** 21.357*** 11.197*** 23.297*** 12.327***





% Urban (50,000) 8.687*** -0.976
[0.832] [1.016]
Riv.*% urban (50,000) 14.523***
[0.918]
% Urban (20,000) 5.699*** -1.792**
[0.700] [0.797]
Riv.*% urban (20,000) 12.788***
[0.716]
Observations 3551 3551 5341 5341 5134 5134
R-squared 0.785 0.789 0.712 0.725 0.715 0.732
All specifications include country and time fixed eﬀects and standard errors clustered by country.
Standard errors in brackets. *** p0.01, ** p0.05, * p0.1
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Table 11: Robustness: Specification and Sample Selection
Primary enrollment rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rivalry 235.331*** 162.249 102.291*** 185.977*** 7.798 120.891***
[50.843] [146.363] [14.971] [22.597] [22.872] [16.390]
Polity2 -6.038*** -89.206*** -5.397*** -8.944*** -8.505*** -2.500**
[1.836] [27.911] [1.187] [1.753] [1.272] [1.245]
Rivalry*polity2 2.733 92.965*** 5.597*** 14.514*** 6.204*** 7.671***
[2.318] [27.914] [1.595] [2.323] [1.763] [1.737]
Rel. army rivals 8.685*** -0.707 10.823*** 2.664** 1.101









Population growth 3.689*** 8.957*** 3.612*** 7.650*** 2.880*** 5.720***
[0.566] [0.655] [0.454] [0.513] [0.474] [0.445]
Military expenditure p.c. -0.330*** -0.532*** -0.193*** -0.634*** -0.372*** -0.217***
[0.042] [0.067] [0.051] [0.065] [0.048] [0.053]
Observations 2692 1952 3927 3099 4285 4175
R-squared 0.778 0.838 0.838 0.813 0.842 0.816
All specifications include country and time fixed eﬀects and standard errors clustered by country.
Standard errors in brackets. ***p0.01,**p0.05,*p0.1.. (4) excludes Western Europe.
In (5) country FE are interacted with before/after 1950 dummies. (6) includes continent-specific time trends.
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Table 12: Barro-Lee Education Attainment Data
Percentage of primary schooling attained 5 years later by adults 15-19 years old
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rivalry 3.049* 3.334 3.243
[1.844] [2.595] [2.571]
Polity2 -0.365** -0.345** -0.346** -0.196 -0.198
[0.146] [0.153] [0.153] [0.123] [0.122]
Rivalry*Polity2 0.452** 0.892*** 0.893***
[0.206] [0.257] [0.257]
Rel. army largest rival -0.151
[0.641]
Rel. army total rivals -0.095
[0.558]
War in previous 10 years 7.032***
[2.090]
War in 10 years*Polity2 -0.164
[0.257]
Won war in previous 10 years 5.247*
[2.882]
Lost war in previous 10 years 9.188***
[2.619]
Won war in 10 years*Polity2 0.241
[0.349]
Lost war in 10 years*Polity2 -0.338
[0.315]
Military expenditure p.c. 0.006 -0.001 -0.001 0.005 0.005
[0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004]
Govt expenditure p.c. -0.002** -0.001* -0.001* -0.001** -0.001**
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Observations 1114 952 952 1114 1114
R-squared 0.112 0.098 0.098 0.116 0.122
All specifications include country and time FE and standard errors clustered by country.
Standard errors in brackets. ***p0.01,**p0.05,*p0.1.
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Table 13: Military Expenditure and Rivalry
Military expenditure per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rivalry 34.084*** 30.979*** 31.256*** 32.491*** 32.841*
[10.049] [10.678] [10.792] [5.925] [17.328]
Polity2 -4.206*** -4.291*** -2.984*** -9.043***
[0.706] [0.852] [0.394] [1.307]
Rivalry*Polity2 0.204 -1.337** 5.498***
[1.149] [0.624] [1.819]
Rel. army largest rival 0.402
[0.823]
Share of industry in GDP -5.406***
[0.685]
Population growth. -1.218*** -1.279*** -1.281*** 1.358*** -2.293***
[0.241] [0.257] [0.257] [0.129] [0.455]
Observations 9113 8283 8283 6914 5273
R-squared 0.451 0.442 0.442 0.684 0.403
All specifications include country and time FE and standard errors clustered by country.
Standard errors in brackets. *** p0.01, ** p0.05, * p0.1
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Table 14: Education and Probability of Victory
Probability of war Probability of winning
in next 10 years if war in next 10 years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Primary enrollment per 10,000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.009***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.002]
Democracy score 0.004 0.007 0.001 -0.016
[0.007] [0.007] [0.051] [0.070]




Observations 4117 3453 320 280
All specifications include country and time FE and standard errors clustered by country.
Standard errors in brackets. *** p0.01, ** p0.05, * p0.1
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Table 15: Road Investments, Rivalry and Democracy
% change in length of paved roads
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rivalry 1.856** 1.801** 1.732** 1.879**
[0.859] [0.853] [0.862] [0.861]






Military expenditure p.c. 0.003 0.004** 0.004** 0.005*
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003]
Observations 9113 8283 8283 6914
R-squared 0.451 0.442 0.442 0.684
All specifications include country and time FE and SE clustered by country.




Country Period External Threat New Policies Key Figures Outcome
Prussia 1810s Defeat of Iena in 1806
1. Reforms of curricula, teaching methods and teacher education
2. Delegating power to local communities regarding administration and 
funding of schools
3. Foundation of Berlin University
Wilhelm von Humboldt
Baron vom Stein
1. Failure in the short run due to the opposition of the French
2. Substantial impact in the long run: 
- 16.8% of males born in Prussia before 1801 were completely illiterate, as against 
2.9% for males born between 1837 and 1841 9
- starting in the 1810s, literacy rates gradually increased and reached 85% in 1850 3
- Prussia became the leader for primary enrollment until the 1880s 4
- schools remained funded primarily by local taxes throughout the XIXth century 4
3. Primary school enrollment per 10,000 people:  1131 in 1815 vs. 1592 in 1850 5 **
France 1880s Franco-Prussian War of 1870
1. Abolition of all fees and tuition charges in public elementary schools
2. Education is made compulsory until age 13
3. Religious education in public school is forbidden
4. 17,320 new schools are built, 5,428 enlarged, 8,381 repaired 1 
5. The new curriculum promotes patriotism
Jules Ferry
1. France overtook Prussia as the leader for primary enrollment in the 1880s 4
2. Literacy rates quickly increased from 80% in 1870 to 96% in 1912 6 
3. Increased sense of patriotism and unity 1
4. Primary school enrollment per 10,000 people: 1176 in 1870 vs.  1430 in 1912 5 **
Japan 1870s Risk of colonization by Western powers
1. Introduction of modern science in the curriculum
2. Elementary education is made compulsory 
3. 25,000 new schools are built 2
Mori Arinori
Yamagata Aritomo
1. Strong popular resistance in early stages
2. Resounding success in a few decades:
- Japan overtook most European powers in terms of primary enrollment, which 
rose from 28.1% in 1873 to 98.1% in 1910 7
- from 1865 to 1910, the literacy rate increased from 35% to 75% for men and from 
8% to 68% for women 7
- traditionalists and progressives agreed on the curriculum planned by the 1890 
Imperial Rescript 
8
3. Primary school enrollment per 10,000 people: 65 in 1876 vs. 1122 in 1905 5 **
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